Showing posts with label chef. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chef. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

Chef and Encrypted Data Bags - Revisted

In my previous post here I described the logic behind wanting to store data in an encrypted form in our Chef data bags. I also described some general encryption techniques and gotchas for making that happen.

I've since done quite a bit of work in that regard and implemented this at our company. I wanted to go over a bit of detail about how to use my solution. Fair warning, this is a long post. Lot's of scrolling.

A little recap

As I mentioned in my previous post, the only reliable way to do the encryption of data bag items in an automated fashion is to handle key management yourself outside of Chef. I mentioned two techniques:

  • storing the decryption key on the server in a flat file
  • calling a remote resource to grab the key

Essentially the biggest problem of this issue is key management and, in an optimal world, how to automate it reliably. For this demonstration, I've gone with storing a flat text file on the server. As I also said in my previous post, this assumes you tightly control access to that server. We're going with the original assumption that if a malicious person gets on your box, you're screwed no matter what.

Creating the key file

I used the knife command to handle my key creation for now:

knife ssh '*:*' interactive
echo "somedecryptionstringblahblahblah" > /tmp/.chef_decrypt.key
chmod 0640 /tmp/.chef_decrypt.key

Setting up the databags and the rake tasks

One of the previous things I mentioned is knowing when and what to encrypt. Be sensible and keep it simple. We don't want to throw out the baby with the bath water. The Chef platform has lots of neat search capabilities that we'd like to keep. In this vein, I've created a fairly opinionated method for storing the encrypted data bag items.

We're going to want to create a new databag called "passwords". The format of the data bag is VERY simple:


We have an "id" that we want to use and the plaintext value that we want to encrypt.

Rake tasks

In my local chef-repo, I've created a 'tasks' folder. In that folder, I've added the following file:


As you can see, this requires a rubygem called encrypted_strings. I've done a cursory glance over the code and I can't see anything immediately unsafe about it. It only provides an abstraction to the native OpenSSL support in Ruby with an additional String helper. However I'm not a cryptographer by any stretch so you should do your own due diligence.

At the end of your existing Rakefile, add the following:

load File.join(TOPDIR, 'tasks','encrypt_databag_item.rake')

If you now run rake -T you should see the new task listed:

rake encrypt_databag[databag_item]  # Encrypt a databag item in the passwords databag

If you didn't already create a sample data bag and item, do so now:

mkdir data_bags/passwords/
echo '{"id":"supersecretpassword","data":"mysupersecretpassword"}' > data_bags/passwords/supersecretpassword.json

Now we run the rake task:

rake encrypt_databag[supersecretpassword]

Found item: supersecretpassword. Encrypting
Encrypted data is <some ugly string>
Uploading to Chef server
INFO: Updated data_bag_item[supersecretpassword_crypted.json]

You can test that the data was uploaded successfully:

knife data bag show passwords supersecretpassword

{
"data": "<some really ugly string>",
"id": "supersecretpassword"
}

Additionally, you should have in your 'data_bags/passwords' directory a new file called 'supersecretpassword_crypted.json'. The reason for keeping both files around is for key management. Should you need to change your passphrase/key, you'll need the original file around to reencrypt with the new key. You can decided to remove the unencrypted file if you want as long as you have a way of recreating it.

Using the encrypted data

So now that we have a data bag item uploaded that we need to use, how do we get it on the client?
That will require two cookbooks:

The general idea is that, in any cookbook you need decrypted data, you essentially do three things:
  • include the decryption recipe
  • include_recipe "databag_decrypt::default"
    
  • assign the crypted data to a value via databag search
    password = search(:passwords, "id:supersecretpassword").first
  • assign the decrypted data to a value for use in the rest of the recipe
    decrypted_password = item_decrypt(password[:data])

From there, it's no different that any other recipe. Here's an example of how I use it to securely store Amazon S3 credentials as databag items:

include_recipe "databag_decrypt::default"
s3_access_key = item_decrypt(search(:passwords, "id:s3_access_key").first[:data])
s3_secret_key = item_decrypt(search(:passwords, "id:s3_secret_key").first[:data])
s3_file erlang_tar_gz do
  bucket "our-packages"
  object_name erlang_file_name
  aws_access_key_id s3_access_key
  aws_secret_access_key s3_secret_key
  checksum erl_checksum
end

Changing the key

Should you need to change the key, you'll need to jump through a few hoops:

  • Update the passphrase on each client. Ease depends on your method of key distribution
  • Update the passphrase in the rake task
  • Reencypt all your data bag items.
The last one can be a pain in the ass. Since Chef currently doesn't support multiple items in a data bag json file, I created a small helper script in my chef-repo called 'split-em.rb'.
I store all of my data bag items in large json files and use split-em.rb to break them into individual files. Those file I upload with knife:

bin/split-em.rb -f data_bags/passwords/passwords.json -d passwords -o

Parsing data for svnpass into file data_bags/passwords/svnpass.json
Parsing data for s3_access_key into file data_bags/passwords/s3_access_key.json
Parsing data for s3_secret_key into file data_bags/passwords/s3_secret_key.json
#Run the following command to load the split bags into the passwords in chef
for i in svnpass s3_access_key s3_secret_key; do knife data bag from file passwords $i.json; done

You could then run that through the rake task to reupload the encrypted data:

for i in svnpass s3_access_key s3_secret_key; do rake encrypt_databag[$i]; done

Limitations/Gotchas/Additional Tips

Take note of the following, please.

Key management

The current method of key management is somewhat cumbersome. Ideally, the passphrase should be moved outside of the rake task. Additionally, the rekey process should be made a distinct rake task. I imagine a workflow similar to this:

  • rake accepts a path to the encryption key
  • additional rake task to change the encryption key in the form of oldpassfile/newpassfile.
  • Existing data is decrypted using oldpassfile, reencrypted using new passfile and sent back to the chef server.

Optimally, the rake task would understand the same attributes that the decryption cookbook does so it can handle key managment on the client for you. I'd also like to make the cipher selection configurable as well an integrate it into the above steps.

Duplicate work

Seth Falcon at Opscode is already in the process of adding official support for encrypted data bags to Chef. His method involves converting the entire databag sans "id" to YAML and encrypting it. I wholeheartedly support that effort but that would obviously require a universal upgrade to Chef as well. The purpose of my cookbook and tasks is to work with the existing version.

AWS IAM

If you're an Amazon EC2 user, you should start using IAM NOW. Stop putting your master credentials in to recipes and limit your risk. I've created a 'chef' user who I give limited access to certain AWS operations. You can see the policy file here. It gives the chef user read-only access to 'my_bucket' and 'my_other_bucket'.
If you wanted to get REALLY sneaky, you could use fake two-factor authentication to store your key in S3:

  • Encrypt data bag items with "crediential B" password except for one item "s3_credentials"
  • s3_credentials (crendential A) is encrypted with a passphrase and managed similar to this article
  • Use transient credentials to access S3 and grab a passphrase file (credential B)
  • Decrypt data with secondary credentials
You would have to heavily modify the cookbook to do this. I think the current implementation is fine.

File-based passphrases

I'm not a big fan of the file-based passphrase method. While we agreed that you should consider yourself screwed if someone gets on the box, that still leaves poorly coded applications running as an attack vector. Imagine you have an application that must run as root. Now it can read the passphrase. Should that application become remotely exploitable, the passphrase file is vulnerable. I'm leaning to the method of a private server that allows RESTful access to grab the key. I've already added support in the cookbook for a passphrase type of 'url'.

Wrapup

I think that covers anything. I'd love some feedback on what people think. We've already implemented this in a limited scope for using IAM credentials in our cookbooks. I can easily revoke those should they get compromised without having to generate all new master keys.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Chef and encrypted data bags.

As part of rolling out Chef at the new gig, we had a choice - stand up our own Chef server and maintain it or use the Opscode platform. From a cost perspective, the 50 node platform cost was pretty much break even with standing up another EC2 instance of our own. The upshot was that I didn't have to maintain it.

 

However, part of due diligence was making sure everything was covered from a security perspective. We use quite a few hosted/SaaS tools but this one had the biggest possible security risk. The biggest concern is dealing with sensitive data such as database passwords and AWS credentials. The Opscode platform as a whole is secure. It makes heavy use of SSL not only for transport layer encryption but also for authentication and authorization. That wasn't a concern. What was a concern was what should happen if a copy of our CouchDB database fell into the wrong hands or a "site reliability engineer" situation happened. That's where the concept of "encrypted data bags" came from for me.

 

Atlanta Chef Hack Day

I had the awesome opportunity to stop by the Atlanta Chef Hack day this past weekend. I couldn't stay long and came in fairly late in the afternoon. However I happened to come in right at the time that @botchagalupe (John Willis) and @schisamo (Seth Chisamore) brought up encrypted data bags. Of course, Willis proceeded to turn around and put me on the spot. After explaining the above use case, we all threw out some ideas but I think everyone came to the conclusion that it's a tough nut to crack with a shitload of gotchas.

 

Before I left, I got a chance to talk with @sfalcon (Seth Falcon) about his ideas. While he totally understood the use cases and mentioned that other people had asked about it as well, he had a few ideas but nothing that stood out as the best way.

 

So what are the options? I'm going to list a few here but I wanted to discuss a little bit about the security domain we're dealing with and what inherent holes exist.

 

Reality Checks

  • Nothing is totally secure.

          Deal with it. Even though it's a remote chance in hell, your keys and/or data are going to be decrypted somewhere at some point in time. The type of information we need to read, unfortunately, can't use a one-way encryption algo like MD5 or SHA because we NEED to know what the data actually is. I need that MySQL password to provide to my application server to talk to the database. That means it has to be decrypted and during that process and during usage of that data, it's going to exist in a possible place that it can be snagged.

  • You don't need to encrypt everything

          You need to understand what exactly needs to be encrypted and why. Yes, there's the "200k winter coats to troops" scenario and every bit of information you expose provides additional material for an attack vector but really think about what you need to encrypt. Application database account usernames? Probably not. The passwords for those accounts? Yes. Consider the "value" of the data you're considering encrypting.

  • Don't forget the "human" factor

          So you've got this amazing library worked out, added it to your cookbooks and you're only encrypting what you need to really encrypt. Then some idiot puts the decryption key on the wiki or the master password is 5 alphabetical characters. As we often said when I was a kid, "Smooth move, exlax"

  • There might be another way

          There might be another way to approach the issue. Make sure you've looked at all the options.

 

Our Use Case

So understanding that, we can narrow down our focus a bit. Let's use the use case of our applications database password because it's a simple enough case. It's a single string.

 

Now in a perfect world, Opscode would encrypt each CouchDB database with customer specific credentials (like say an organizational level client cert) and discards the credentials once you've downloaded them.

 

That's our first gotcha - What happens when the customer loses the key? All that data is now lost to the world. 

 

But let's assume you were smart and kept a backup copy of the key in a secure location. There's another gotcha inherent in the platform itself - Chef Solr. If that entire database is encrypted, unless Opscode HAS the key, they can't index the data with Solr and all those handy searches you're using in your recipes to pull in all your users is gone. Now you'll have to manage the map/reduce views yourself and deal with the performance impact where you don't have one of those views in place.

 

So that option is out. The Chef server has to be able to see the data to actually work.

 

What about a master key? That has several problems.

 

You have to store the key somewhere accessible to the client (i.e. the client chef.rb or in an external file that your recipes can read to decrypt those data bag items).

  • How do you distribute the master key to the clients?
  • How do you revoke the master key to the clients and how does that affect future runs? See the previous line - how do you then distribute the updated key?

 

I'm sure someone just said "I'll put it in a data bag" and then promptly smacked themselves in the head. Chicken - meet Egg. Or is it the other way around?

 

You could have the Chef client ASK you for the key (remember apache SSL startups where the startup script required a password? Yeah, that sucked.

 

 

Going the Master Key Route

So let's assume that we want to go this route and use a master key. We know we can't store in with Opscode because that defeats the purpose. We need a way to distribute the master key to the clients so they can decrypt the data so how do we do it?

 

If you're using Amazon, you might say "I'll store it in S3 or on an EBS volume". That's great! Where do you store the AWS credentials? "In a data ba...oh wait. I've seen this movie before, haven't I?"

 

So we've come to the conclusion that we must store the master key somewhere ourselves locally available to the client. Depending on your platforming, you have a few options:

  • Make it part of the base AMI
  • Make it part of your kickstart script
  • Make it part of your vmware image

 

All of those are acceptable but they don't deal with updating/revocation. Creating new AMIs is a pain in the ass and you have to update all your scripts with new AMI ids when you do that. Golden images are never golden. Do you really want to rekick a box just to update the key?

 

Now we realize we have to make it dynamic. You could make it a part of a startup script in the AMI, first boot of the image or the like. Essentially, "when you startup, go here and grab this key". Of course now you've got to maintain a server to distribute the information and you probably want two of them just to be safe, right? Now we're spreading our key around again.

 

This is starting to look like an antipattern.

 

But let's just say we got ALL of that worked out. We have a simple easy way for clients to get and maintain the key. It works and your data is stored "securely" and you feel comfortable with it.

 

Then your master key gets compromised. No problem, you think. I'll just use my handy update mechanism to update the keys on all the clients and...shit...now I've got to re-encrypt EVERYTHING and re-upload my data bags. Where the hell is the plaintext of those passwords again? This is getting complicated, no?

 

So what's the answer? Is there one? Obviously, if you were that hypersensitive to the security implications you'd just run your own server anyway. You still have the human factor and backups can still be stolen but that's an issue outside of Chef as a tool. You just move the security up the stack a bit. You've got to secure the Chef server itself. But can you still use the Opscode platform? I think so. With careful deliberation and structure, you can reach a happy point that allows you to still automate your infrastructure with Chef (or some other tool) and host the data off-site.

 

Some options

Certmaster

 

Certmaster spun out of the Func project. It's essentially an SSL certificate server at the base. It's another thing you have to manage but it can handle all the revocation and distribution issues.

Riak

 

This is one idea I came up with tonight. The idea is that you run a very small Riak instance on all the nodes that require the ability to decrypt the data. Every node is a part of the same cluster and this can all be easily managed with Chef. It will probably have a single bucket containing the master key. You get the fault tolerance built in and you can pull the keys as part of your recipe using basic Chef resources. Resource utilization on the box should be VERY low for the erlang processes. You'll have a bit more network chatter as the intra-cluster gossip goes on though. Revocation is still an issue but that's VERY easily managed since it's a simple HTTP put to update. And while the data is easily accessible to anyone who can get access to the box, you should consider yourself "proper f'cked" if that happens anyway.

 

But you still have the issue of re-encrypting the databags should that need to happen. My best suggestion is to store the encrypted values in a single data bag and add a rake task that does the encryption/revocation for you. Then you minimize the impact of something that simply should not need to happen that often.

 

Another option is to still use Riak but store the credentials themselves (as opposed to a decryption key) and pull them in when the client runs. The concern I have there is how that affects idempotence and would it cause the recipe to be run every single time just because it can't checksum properly? You probably get around this with a file on the filesystem telling Chef to skip the update using "not_if". 

 

Wrap Up

 

As you can see, there's no silver bullet here. Right now I have two needs, storing credentials for S3/EBS access and storing database passwords. That's it. We don't use passwords for user accounts at all. You can't even use password authentication with SSH on our servers. If I don't have your pubkey in the users data bag, you can't log in.  

 

The AWS credentials are slowly becoming less of an issue. With the Identity Access beta product, I can create limited use keys that can only do certain things and grant them access to specific AWS products. I can make it a part of node creation to generate that access programatically. That means I still have the database credentials issue though. For that, I'm thinking that the startup script for an appserver, for instance, will just have to pull the credentials from Riak (or whatever central location you choose) and update a JNDI string. It spreads your configuration data out a bit but these things shouldn't need to change to often and with proper documented process you know exactly how to update it.

 

One thing that this whole thing causes is that it begins to break down the ability to FULLY automate everything. I don't like running the knife command to do things. I want to be able to programatically run the same thing that Knife does from my own scripts. I suppose I could simply popen and run the knife commands but shelling out always feels like an anti-pattern to me.

 

I'd love some feedback on how other people are addressing the same issues!