Chef and encrypted data bags.

As part of rolling out Chef at the new gig, we had a choice - stand up our own Chef server and maintain it or use the Opscode platform. From a cost perspective, the 50 node platform cost was pretty much break even with standing up another EC2 instance of our own. The upshot was that I didn't have to maintain it.

 

However, part of due diligence was making sure everything was covered from a security perspective. We use quite a few hosted/SaaS tools but this one had the biggest possible security risk. The biggest concern is dealing with sensitive data such as database passwords and AWS credentials. The Opscode platform as a whole is secure. It makes heavy use of SSL not only for transport layer encryption but also for authentication and authorization. That wasn't a concern. What was a concern was what should happen if a copy of our CouchDB database fell into the wrong hands or a "site reliability engineer" situation happened. That's where the concept of "encrypted data bags" came from for me.

 

Atlanta Chef Hack Day

I had the awesome opportunity to stop by the Atlanta Chef Hack day this past weekend. I couldn't stay long and came in fairly late in the afternoon. However I happened to come in right at the time that @botchagalupe (John Willis) and @schisamo (Seth Chisamore) brought up encrypted data bags. Of course, Willis proceeded to turn around and put me on the spot. After explaining the above use case, we all threw out some ideas but I think everyone came to the conclusion that it's a tough nut to crack with a shitload of gotchas.

 

Before I left, I got a chance to talk with @sfalcon (Seth Falcon) about his ideas. While he totally understood the use cases and mentioned that other people had asked about it as well, he had a few ideas but nothing that stood out as the best way.

 

So what are the options? I'm going to list a few here but I wanted to discuss a little bit about the security domain we're dealing with and what inherent holes exist.

 

Reality Checks

• Nothing is totally secure.

          Deal with it. Even though it's a remote chance in hell, your keys and/or data are going to be decrypted somewhere at some point in time. The type of information we need to read, unfortunately, can't use a one-way encryption algo like MD5 or SHA because we NEED to know what the data actually is. I need that MySQL password to provide to my application server to talk to the database. That means it has to be decrypted and during that process and during usage of that data, it's going to exist in a possible place that it can be snagged.

• You don't need to encrypt everything

          You need to understand what exactly needs to be encrypted and why. Yes, there's the "200k winter coats to troops" scenario and every bit of information you expose provides additional material for an attack vector but really think about what you need to encrypt. Application database account usernames? Probably not. The passwords for those accounts? Yes. Consider the "value" of the data you're considering encrypting.

• Don't forget the "human" factor

          So you've got this amazing library worked out, added it to your cookbooks and you're only encrypting what you need to really encrypt. Then some idiot puts the decryption key on the wiki or the master password is 5 alphabetical characters. As we often said when I was a kid, "Smooth move, exlax"

• There might be another way

          There might be another way to approach the issue. Make sure you've looked at all the options.

 

Our Use Case

So understanding that, we can narrow down our focus a bit. Let's use the use case of our applications database password because it's a simple enough case. It's a single string.

 

Now in a perfect world, Opscode would encrypt each CouchDB database with customer specific credentials (like say an organizational level client cert) and discards the credentials once you've downloaded them.

 

That's our first gotcha - What happens when the customer loses the key? All that data is now lost to the world. 

 

But let's assume you were smart and kept a backup copy of the key in a secure location. There's another gotcha inherent in the platform itself - Chef Solr. If that entire database is encrypted, unless Opscode HAS the key, they can't index the data with Solr and all those handy searches you're using in your recipes to pull in all your users is gone. Now you'll have to manage the map/reduce views yourself and deal with the performance impact where you don't have one of those views in place.

 

So that option is out. The Chef server has to be able to see the data to actually work.

 

What about a master key? That has several problems.

 

You have to store the key somewhere accessible to the client (i.e. the client chef.rb or in an external file that your recipes can read to decrypt those data bag items).

• How do you distribute the master key to the clients?
• How do you revoke the master key to the clients and how does that affect future runs? See the previous line - how do you then distribute the updated key?

 

I'm sure someone just said "I'll put it in a data bag" and then promptly smacked themselves in the head. Chicken - meet Egg. Or is it the other way around?

 

You could have the Chef client ASK you for the key (remember apache SSL startups where the startup script required a password? Yeah, that sucked.

 

 

Going the Master Key Route

So let's assume that we want to go this route and use a master key. We know we can't store in with Opscode because that defeats the purpose. We need a way to distribute the master key to the clients so they can decrypt the data so how do we do it?

 

If you're using Amazon, you might say "I'll store it in S3 or on an EBS volume". That's great! Where do you store the AWS credentials? "In a data ba...oh wait. I've seen this movie before, haven't I?"

 

So we've come to the conclusion that we must store the master key somewhere ourselves locally available to the client. Depending on your platforming, you have a few options:

• Make it part of the base AMI
• Make it part of your kickstart script
• Make it part of your vmware image

 

All of those are acceptable but they don't deal with updating/revocation. Creating new AMIs is a pain in the ass and you have to update all your scripts with new AMI ids when you do that. Golden images are never golden. Do you really want to rekick a box just to update the key?

 

Now we realize we have to make it dynamic. You could make it a part of a startup script in the AMI, first boot of the image or the like. Essentially, "when you startup, go here and grab this key". Of course now you've got to maintain a server to distribute the information and you probably want two of them just to be safe, right? Now we're spreading our key around again.

 

This is starting to look like an antipattern.

 

But let's just say we got ALL of that worked out. We have a simple easy way for clients to get and maintain the key. It works and your data is stored "securely" and you feel comfortable with it.

 

Then your master key gets compromised. No problem, you think. I'll just use my handy update mechanism to update the keys on all the clients and...shit...now I've got to re-encrypt EVERYTHING and re-upload my data bags. Where the hell is the plaintext of those passwords again? This is getting complicated, no?

 

So what's the answer? Is there one? Obviously, if you were that hypersensitive to the security implications you'd just run your own server anyway. You still have the human factor and backups can still be stolen but that's an issue outside of Chef as a tool. You just move the security up the stack a bit. You've got to secure the Chef server itself. But can you still use the Opscode platform? I think so. With careful deliberation and structure, you can reach a happy point that allows you to still automate your infrastructure with Chef (or some other tool) and host the data off-site.

 

Some options

Certmaster

 

Certmaster spun out of the Func project. It's essentially an SSL certificate server at the base. It's another thing you have to manage but it can handle all the revocation and distribution issues.

Riak

 

This is one idea I came up with tonight. The idea is that you run a very small Riak instance on all the nodes that require the ability to decrypt the data. Every node is a part of the same cluster and this can all be easily managed with Chef. It will probably have a single bucket containing the master key. You get the fault tolerance built in and you can pull the keys as part of your recipe using basic Chef resources. Resource utilization on the box should be VERY low for the erlang processes. You'll have a bit more network chatter as the intra-cluster gossip goes on though. Revocation is still an issue but that's VERY easily managed since it's a simple HTTP put to update. And while the data is easily accessible to anyone who can get access to the box, you should consider yourself "proper f'cked" if that happens anyway.

 

But you still have the issue of re-encrypting the databags should that need to happen. My best suggestion is to store the encrypted values in a single data bag and add a rake task that does the encryption/revocation for you. Then you minimize the impact of something that simply should not need to happen that often.

 

Another option is to still use Riak but store the credentials themselves (as opposed to a decryption key) and pull them in when the client runs. The concern I have there is how that affects idempotence and would it cause the recipe to be run every single time just because it can't checksum properly? You probably get around this with a file on the filesystem telling Chef to skip the update using "not_if". 

 

Wrap Up

 

As you can see, there's no silver bullet here. Right now I have two needs, storing credentials for S3/EBS access and storing database passwords. That's it. We don't use passwords for user accounts at all. You can't even use password authentication with SSH on our servers. If I don't have your pubkey in the users data bag, you can't log in.  

 

The AWS credentials are slowly becoming less of an issue. With the Identity Access beta product, I can create limited use keys that can only do certain things and grant them access to specific AWS products. I can make it a part of node creation to generate that access programatically. That means I still have the database credentials issue though. For that, I'm thinking that the startup script for an appserver, for instance, will just have to pull the credentials from Riak (or whatever central location you choose) and update a JNDI string. It spreads your configuration data out a bit but these things shouldn't need to change to often and with proper documented process you know exactly how to update it.

 

One thing that this whole thing causes is that it begins to break down the ability to FULLY automate everything. I don't like running the knife command to do things. I want to be able to programatically run the same thing that Knife does from my own scripts. I suppose I could simply popen and run the knife commands but shelling out always feels like an anti-pattern to me.

 

I'd love some feedback on how other people are addressing the same issues!

 

Fix it or Kick It and the ten minute maxim

One of the things I brought up in my presentation to the Atlanta DevOps group was the concept of "Payment". One of the arguments that people like to trot out when you suggest an operational shift is that "We can't afford to change right now". My argument is that you CAN'T afford to change. It's going to cost you more in the long run. The problem is that in many situations, the cost is detached from the original event.

Take testing. Let's assume you don't make unit testing an enforced part of your development cycle. There are tons of reasons people do this but much of it revolves around time. We don't have time to write tests. We don't have time to wait for tests to run. We've heard them all. Sure you get lucky. Maybe things go out the door with no discernible bugs. But what happens 3 weeks down the road when the same bug that you solved 6 weeks ago crops up again? It's hard to measure the cost when it's so far removed from the origination.

Configuration management is the same way. I'm not going to lie. Configuration management is a pain in the ass especially if you didn't make it a core concept from inception. You have to think about your infrastructure a bit. You'll have to duplicate work initially (i.e. templating config files). It's not easy but it pays off in the long run. However as with so many things, the cost is detached from the original purchase.

Fix it?

Walk with me into my imagination. A scary place where a server has started to misbehave. What's your initial thought? What's the first thing you do? You've seen this movie and done this interview:

• log on to the box
• perform troubleshooting
• think
• perform troubleshooting
• call vendor support (if it's an option)
• update trouble ticket system
• wait
• troubleshoot
• run vendor diag tools

What's the cost of all that work? What's the cost of that downtime? Let's be generous. Let's assume this is a physical server and you paid for 24x7x4 hardware support and a big old RHEL subscription. How much time would you spend on each task? What's the turn around time to getting that server back into production?

Let's say that the problem was resolved WITHOUT needing replacement hardware but came in at the four hour mark. That's three hours that the server was costing you money instead of making you money. Assuming a standard SA salary of $75k/year in Georgia, that works out to $150. That's just doing a base salary conversion not calculating all the other overhead associated with staffing an employee. What if that person consulted with someone else during that time, a coworker at the same rate, for two of those hours. $225. Not too bad, right? Still a tangible cost. Maybe one you're willing to eat.

But let's assume the end result was to wipe and reinstall. Let's say it takes another hour to get back to operational status. Woops. Forgot to make that tweek to Apache that we made a few weeks ago. Let's spend an hour troubleshooting that.

But we're just talking man power at this point. This doesn't even take into account end-user productivity, loss of customers from degraded performance or any host of issues. God forbid that someone misses something that causes problems to other parts of the environment (like not setting the clock and inserting invalid timestamps into the database or something. Forget that you shouldn't let your app server handle timestamps). Now there's cleanup. All told your people spent 5 hours to get this server back into production while you've been running in a degraded state. What does that mean when our LOB is financial services and we have an SLA and attached penalties? I'm going to go easy on you and let you off with 10k per hour of degraded performance.

Get ready to credit someone $50k or worse cut a physical check.

Kick it!

Now I'm sure everyone is thinking about things like having enough capacity to maintain your SLA even with the loss of one or two nodes but be honest. How many companies actually let you do that? Companies will cut corners. They roll the dice or worse have a misunderstanding of HA versus capacity planning.

What you should have done from the start was kick the box. By kicking the box, I mean performing the equivalent of a kickstart or jumpstart. You should, at ANY time, be able to reinstall a box with no user interaction (other than the action of kicking it) and return it to service in 10 minutes. I'll give you 15 minutes for good measure and bad cabling. My RHEL/CentOS kickstarts are done in 6 minutes on my home network and most of that time is the physical hardware power cycling. With virtualization you don't even have a discernible bootup time.

Unit testing for servers

I'll go even farther. You should be wiping at least one of your core components every two weeks. Yes. Wiping. It should be a part of your deploy process in fact. You should be absolutely sure that should you ever need to reinstall under duress that you can get that server back into service in an acceptable amount of time. Screw the yearly DR tests. I'm giving you a world where you can perform bi-monthly DR tests as a matter of standard operation. All it takes is a little bit of up front planning.

The 10 minute maxim

I have a general rule. Anything that has to be done in ten minutes can be afforded twenty minutes to think it through. Obviously, it's a general rule. The guy holding the gun might not give you twenty minutes. And twenty minutes isn't a hard number. The point is that nothing is generally so critical that it has to be SOLVED that instant. You can spend a little more time up front to do things right or you can spend a boatload of time on the backside trying to fix it.

Given the above scenario, you would think I'm being hypocritical or throwing out my own rule. I'm not. The above scenario should have never happened. This is a solved problem. You should have spent 20 minutes actually putting the config file you just changed into puppet instead of making undocumented ad-hoc changes. You should have spent an hour when bringing up the environment to stand up a CM tool instead of just installing the servers and doing everything manually. That's the 10 minute maxim. Take a little extra time now or take a lot of time later.

You decide how much you're willing to spend.

The opposite of DevOps

I thought about whether or not to write this post but I think it's an interesting example of the kinds of problems that the DevOps methodology is trying to solve.

I turned in my two weeks notice with the paper on Friday. There were several reasons but none of them are a negative reflection on my employer. The role I was originally hired for was no longer valid and there wasn't a transition path because of platform changes in the back office. I could have stayed (and was asked to stay) but there wasn't anything long term where my skill set was useful. As with any key team member, meetings are called to discuss any outstanding issues, transition responsibilities and the like.

In preparation for the meeting today, I drew up a list my responsibilities at a macro level and then broke that down by task. As it's always been for me, that list spanned several "silos" in the traditional IT organization model. Here's a sample snippit:

Subversion	User Management, Repository Management
MySQL	User Management, Database Management, Performance Management
Linux	User Management, OS Configuration, Application Management, Code Management
Puppet	Configuration Management, Recipe Management
Ruby	VM Management, Gem Management

There were also entries for various internal applications that I've worked on (including some development) and supported from an operational perspective. Mind you, I was embedded as an operations guy with a specific development group in the organization. Sort of a DevOps-lite role.

What was really interesting about the meeting was how the lines were broken down. Literally lines were drawn as to where operations would stop supporting something and the group I was leaving would take over. Take the Linux example:

Application Management was intended to refer to software that was "standard" as a part of the distro. Things like Apache or MySQL. Code Management refers to our internally developed code (all Rails applications except for the sexy Sinatra webservice I wrote). In the end, the responsibilities were shifted divided like so:

- Operations Team supported up to the installation and configuration of Apache (including vhosts) with the exclusion of Passenger configuration.

- Passenger configuration and internal code would now be managed by the Development group. They would handle deployments themselves via Webistrano.

- MySQL? Passed on to those currently managing the MSSQL database servers.

That's the very definition of a silo'd IT infrastructure. Everything is thrown over the wall. At least the deploys remain with the development team. There is nothing "wrong" with this model of IT governance. It's not agile but many companies use it. Contrast that to the position I'll be starting on the 6th of July.

An explicit group is being formed inside the company called "DevOps". I know that at this point everyone is incredulous. I can hear it now; "You're doing it wrong!". Interestingly enough, I asked the same question during the interview process. We all know that DevOps is model and philosophy and not a title or department. You don't have two development teams - Agile and Waterfall. You have Developers and they use one methodology over the other. The same goes for Operations. The people I was interviewing with were cognizant of this fact as well. The reason the group is being called "DevOps" is strictly for organizational and political reasons. The goal of the team is to actually develop a set of operational and developmental processes,tools and guidelines that embody everything that DevOps represents.

This is being done inside of one division of the company for now with the Director of Development and Director of Operations essentially sharing a brain and heading things up. The work that this group does will establish and codify something that will be used throughout the rest of the company. We'll be doing development of tools, architecting systems and recommending/implementing solutions that will, among other things, define how the organization operates itself from an IT perspective. Additionally we'll be supporting this as any traditional operations team would but, for now, the group has a distinct title. My title is "Systems Architect" which nice and generic enough to apply to both traditional groups ;)

The only remotely distressing part of the whole thing is that I'll probably have to learn some Python. (tongue firmly in cheek). There's a point to be made that distribution vendors have settled on Python as the Lingua Franca of OS management - excluding things like Chef, Puppet and Nagios which have their own respective DSLs that abstract away much of the language they were written in. Yes, my precious Ruby will still be there when it comes to extending, say, Puppet. I'll probably still write quite a few service checks for Nagios in shell (should Nagios be the best fit).

But language wars aside, I think this gives a clear picture of exactly the types of problems the DevOps methodology is trying to solve. Agility and flexibility across all branches of IT produces a leaner, strong and faster organization that can spend less time "in the muck" (as John Willis likes to say) and start making the company more money.

Finally getting to dig into Puppet

Well I'm finally getting to dig into Puppet at a professional level. I've been handed the keys to establishing the Puppet infrastructure. Mixed Linux/Solaris clients. Beyond the hassle of building up-to-date RPMs for CentOS/RHEL, everything else is going smoothly.

I've got all of my configuration in version control and handy script to create new modules from templates. I'm already pushing out OS specific configurations as well as OS version specific stuff. Augeas is AMAZING. I don't know how I never found/saw it before.

We're also pushing out Splunk (Cox is a huge Splunk customer) across the board. I'm still undecided about its value but I haven't really looked at it since it first came out. It just seemed, at the time, like a huge overhead for a problem that was already tackled (syslogging).

My next step is deciding how to integrate everything into my Kickstart scripts. There's a TON of options out there. I'm really trying to avoid setting up Cobbler but I might be at the end of what can be done with Kickstart already.

I'm still frustrated with managing current versions of Ruby and gems with RPM but gem2rpm has made some of that easier. I'm not responsible for the Solaris boxen so I have no idea how those guys plan on managing those bad boys.